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THE IMPERATIVE OF NATURAL RIGHTS IN TODAY’S WORLD
Randy E. Barnett
If there is any group that really needs to understand the concept of natural
rights, it is professors of constitutional law. The document they teach was written
by a generation who uniformly believed in natural rights, used the concept to
justify a violent revolution from their mother country, and professed their
continued commitment to natural rights long after the separation—a commitment
that only intensified in the years that culminated in the Civil War and the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Natural rights are enshrined in the text of the
Constitution in at least two places. First, there is the Ninth Amendment that
reads, “The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny or disparage other retained by the people.” Upon the evidence
there can be no doubt that the rights “retained by the people” are natural liberty
rights. The Fourteenth Amendment reads, in part, “No state shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States. . . .” The great weight of the historical evidence supports the conclusion
that, in addition to certain positive rights of U.S. citizenship included in the Bill of
Rights and other laws, “privileges or immunities” refers to natural retained liberty
rights.
Yet few constitutional law professors know much, if anything, about this
fundamental concept even as a historical matter, much less as a concept worthy of
continued application in today’s world. The prime evidence of their lack of
knowledge is the fact that they use the terms “natural rights” and “natural law”
interchangeably despite the historical and theoretical distinctness of these terms.
For one thing, natural law is a much older notion than natural rights, but I will not
dwell here on the intellectual history of these concepts. Nor will I attempt to do
justice to the multiple variations on these concepts among philosophers. Instead, I
will provide what I hope will be viewed as a readily accessible explication of
these concepts that has as much practical application today as it did in the days of
John Locke or James Madison. Although this is decidedly my take on natural law
and natural rights, I think it is true to the heart of the concept and can be used to
make sense of historical materials that are otherwise inexplicable to modern
constitutional scholars. And this vision of natural rights is as important today as it
was in 1776 or 1868.
Let me begin by stressing what natural law and natural rights share in
common: a basic methodology. Both natural law and natural rights are what may
be called normative disciplines, by which I mean intellectual constructs used to
assess how human beings ought to act in pursuit of their objectives. Both employ
a “given-if-then” analysis of the following sort Given the nature of X, if you want
to achieve Y, then you ought to do Z. Modern philosophers know this form of
reasoning as a hypothetical imperative. While their method relies upon the nature
both of human beings and of the world—a knowledge of which is informed by
physical and other empirical sciences—natural law and natural rights theorists use
this “value free” information in the service of human aspirations and goals,
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thereby combining (though not collapsing) the “is” with an “ought.” (Though
many versions of natural law theory also locate the goal or Y in the nature or end
of human beings, the account presented here takes no stance on this further
teleological claim.)
So understood, the natural law mode of reasoning can be seen as pervasive
in human life. For example, it pervades the normative disciplines of agriculture,
architecture, engineering, and medicine. These disciplines are normative in the
sense that they instruct and guide human conduct by telling us how we ought to
act. Each builds upon the knowledge conferred by the theoretical sciences, as
well as on practical knowledge, to address their respective subjects: given the
nature of human beings and the world in which we live, if you want to grow
edible crops/build habitable dwellings/construct usable machines/heal the sick,
then you ought to do Z. Of course, the answers given in Z will vary with the
discipline.
This makes the imperatives within these disciplines dependent on a
commitment to their respective ends. The imperatives of medicine depend upon
caring about making people well. The imperatives of agriculture depend on
caring about producing nutritious food for human consumption. Should anyone
question these ends, some other arguments need to be advanced in response
(hence the further teleological claims of some natural law theories). But
assuming a common concern for the ends of these disciplines, the principles they
teach are as imperative as any principles ever are.
Another feature shared by natural law and natural rights analyses—and
what makes it accurate to call these analyses “natural”—is the content of the X:
the nature of human beings and the world in which we live. Both methods of
analysis abstract from the contingencies of particular persons and circumstances
to identify what persons have in common as persons, including the common
problems of social life, to reach general normative conclusions about action
guiding rules and principles.
So both natural law and natural rights analyses employ the reasoning:
given the nature of human beings and the world in which human beings live and
interact, if you want to accomplish Y, then you ought to respect principles Z.
True, if the nature of human beings and the world are “contingent” in the sense
that they could have been otherwise, then the principles yielded by natural law
reasoning are contingent in this sense as well. But so long as the world is as it is
(and cannot be changed by human fiat or engineering) then the principles remain
fixed as well.
Of course the principles yielded by a natural law or rights analysis are not
to be found in nature. They are human concepts or “constructs,” but neither are
they arbitrary extensions of human will. If not well-grounded in the real world,
they will fail to perform their vital action-guiding function. That these principles
are human “constructs” no more deprecates their functional importance, and
nonarbitrary nature, than does the constructed nature of the concepts and
principles of agriculture, engineering, architecture, and medicine.
What differentiates natural law from natural rights is what goes in the Y.
Natural law and natural rights apply the same basic method of analysis to two
distinct and different (though possibly related) questions. Natural law addresses
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the problem of how we as people ought to live our lives. So natural law addresses
the question: given the nature of human beings and the world in which we live, if
you want to be happy or live a good life, you ought to do Z. Those general
principles to which you ought to adhere are called virtues, those general
categories of actions you ought not do are called vices. On the other hand, one
could also consider “natural law” to be a broader umbrella term to refer to all
normative disciplines based on the nature of human beings, while the problem of
life well is addressed by natural law ethics, but this is merely a semantic choice.
In contrast, the subject of natural rights attempts to discern how human
social interactions should be structured so as to facilitate the pursuit of human
happiness. So natural rights addresses the question: given the nature of human
beings and the world in which we live, if you want a society in which persons
may pursue happiness while living in close proximity to others, then you ought to
do Z. What you ought to do (Z) is properly define and respect the natural rights
or liberties that enable persons to pursue happiness without interfering with the
like pursuit of others with whom they interact. What you ought not do is violate
these properly defined rights. The connection between these two disciplines is
obvious: the pursuit of human happiness or the good life, but the problems they
address are quite different Handling these distinct problems require the emphasis
of different facts (in the X), and the conclusions reached by each mode of analysis
are as different as the conclusions reached by architecture and agriculture.
The purpose of engaging in any of these normative disciplines is to guide
human conduct in highly complex world—a world too complex to understand or
manipulate or navigate without the use of abstractions. Not any abstractions will
do, however. At root they must be grounded on the salient facts of human
existence. But these facts must be selected and honed to reveal the patterns on
which decisions can be made. In short, abstractions must be chosen that reveal
the order, both obvious and hidden, that lies in human nature and the world in
which humans live.
In previous eras, this order was universally thought to have been created
by God. Many believe this even today, or say they do. Thus a discipline like
natural law or natural rights was though by its adherents to be based on something
divine, just as were the disciplines of medicine, agriculture, and engineering. But
the authority of natural law and natural rights did not stem from any divine fiat or
will—from any sort of “divine positivism.” Rather, the wisdom revealed by
natural law and natural rights analyses turned on the order in the world from
which generalizations can be made, and it does not really matter to this analysis
where this order came from.
So it is a serious intellectual error, though one that is all to common, to
associate natural law or natural rights with God or with divine will. Indeed, even
natural law theorists such as Aquinas distinguished between divine law which is
based on the command of God and revealed in scriptures by God’s word, and
natural law which is based in the order in the universe and is discovered by
human reason. In contrast, human law was defined as the commands of human
authorities and, where these commands do not directly reflect natural law, their
imperatives must be promulgated.
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It is completely inaccurate and unfair, not to mention ungenerous, to
characterize natural rights theories as reflecting something called “atomistic
individualism.” That term is meant to connote a view of persons as radically
separated from each other and immune from the effects of others. I know of no
natural rights thinker who fits this description and, if you stop to think about it, no
one is ever named by those who make this charge. Or if someone is named, no
quotations are provided to substantiate this description.
To the contrary, the whole point of a natural rights analysis is to address
the problem of human vulnerability and interconnectedness. No one person is
strong or independent enough to pursue happiness in the face of concerted
opposition from the masses or from a concerted handful of other people—or from
even a single obsessed or evil individual. Natural rights attempts to identify
conceptually the space within which vulnerable people need to be free to make
their own choices about the directions of their lives, which includes crucially the
choices of how to acquire, use, and dispose of scarce physical resources. Once
these rights are identified, it a somewhat but not entirely separate matter of
institutional design to see how they can best be protected in a world in which
others are more than willing, if given half a chance, to interfere with the well
being of others.
Natural rights, therefore, do not enforce themselves. They are rather a
mode of normative analysis used to evaluate and critique the positive law that is
needed to reinforce them. But nevertheless, if they are correctly formulated, there
are real world consequences for violating these rights. Human wellbeing will
suffer and die. No society will survive as a society if these principles are
disregarded completely. But they may be respected more or less fully and the
welfare of those who inhabit a particular regime will prosper or suffer
accordingly.
If empirical demonstrations of the efficacy of particular
formulations of natural rights is desired beyond the appeal of rational argument,
then it may be found in comparisons between those societies who better protect
these rights with those in which such rights are neglected. At the extreme, the
ultimate empirical test is watching the direction the refugees flee.
Both natural law and natural rights, however, have their limits that are not
always acknowledged by their adherents. Based as they are on generalizations
from the particularities of a highly complex world, the principles they yield are
quite abstract—too abstract, indeed, to be applied deductively to any but the most
obvious of situations. Natural law reveals abstract insights into vice and virtue
but the most thoughtful natural law theorists acknowledge that putting these
principles into practice takes judgment, an undefinable “practical wisdom”; that
living well is an art, not an empirical science.
So too with natural rights. Natural rights analysis can identify the
fundamental liberties that all human beings require to pursue happiness while
living in close proximity to others—the rights of several property, freedom of
contract, first possession, self defense, and restitution. But there is no unique
demonstrably correct way of applying these abstract rights to all but the most
simple of real world situations. Lawyers are well aware of just how incredibly
complex real world situations can become. The abstractions of natural rights
provide easy answers to very few of the vexatious problems that confront even
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first year law students in property, torts, and contracts. Although, to be fair, the
cases studied there are deliberately chosen to test the margins of our intuitions on
what differentiates liberty from license.
While respect for properly formulated natural rights is necessary for a
well-functioning social order, it is not sufficient. There must also exist some
method for applying these abstract rights to the complexities of human life so that
human beings can conform their conduct to the requirements of justice. The
injunctions of natural rights must assume an understandable form. This distinct
but related endeavor is known as “the rule of law.” What is needed are
discernable doctrines or practices by which people can order their conduct
towards others and upon which they can rely in making their plans for the future.
Such rules are conventional in the sense that there is no one right set of rules that
will accomplish this end. These rules will vary with the particular circumstances
of different societies. They need to be determined by agreement or otherwise.
And so long as they do not stray outside the frame provided by abstract natural
rights, they can reflect other imperatives such as the ends of fairness and
efficiency.
Still, properly formulated natural rights remain a guide to the outer
boundaries beyond which conventional rules of law should not extend. Natural
rights prevent a completely open-ended experimentation with rules of law. They
provide guidance that avoids catastrophic results without having to experience
them. In sum, natural rights not only point the way to the achievement of what
Hayek called the Great Society in which diverse human beings living within
distinctive communities can flourish. They also prevent the infinite routes to
tyranny and human misery that has been the norm, rather than the exception, of
history. Social experimentation that immiserates millions need not be tried to be
avoided if natural rights are understood and respected.
Therefore, while it is not absolutely necessary to understand the concept of
natural rights to achieve the Great Society, it certainly helps. If nothing else it
cautions intellectuals against succumbing to their natural hubris when, from the
comfort of their parlors, they urge others to destroy the institutions that instantiate
the principles that make social order and human flourishing possible.
____________________________________
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